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A Brief Foreword After the Fact 
 
We ought to be like elephants in the 
noontime sun in summer, when they 
are tormented by heat and thirst and 
catch sight of a cool lake. They throw 
themselves into the water with the 
greatest pleasure and without a mo-
ment’s hesitation. In just the same way, 
for the sake of ourselves and others, 
we should give ourselves joyfully to 
the practice. 
 Kunzang Pelden (b.1862, Tibet)  
The Nectar of Manjushri’s Speech 
  (2007, p. 255) 
  
I felt compelled to introduce this lecture tran-
scription with this passage because, well, it’s 
hilarious and true, and might serve to offset 
some of the necessary dourness in what fol-
lows. It really does capture something of the 
sheer buoyancy and joy of interpretive work, 
despite all its setbacks and suffering and diffi-
culty, despite the dark shadows that some-
times surround it, and how it, necessarily and 
unavoidably, summons the Lord of Death. 
Because these elephants, just like us, are liv-
ing beasts, so, just like us, neither the torment 
nor the great pleasure will last forever. Even 
so, I understand that great snorfling, that 
parched grey meat, hot sun and cracking skin, 
that trumpeting pleasure, and the coolness of 
that plunge.  
  
It certainly is strange, however, to read a 
written transcript of an extemporaneous talk 
whose breath has passed into thin air. 
  
I must say that, reading this, I feel a bit 
like a grandparent who got to drop in and get 
the grandkids all excited, but then gets to 
leave when the hard work sets in. The stu-
dents in this class might have found parts of 
this talk arousing, amusing or inciting, but, as 
H.G. Gadamer (1989, p. 299) said, so simply 
and so clearly, understanding is only just 
barely beginning when something addresses 
us and catches our attention. Then, the diffi-
cult work of composing yourself and compos-
ing your thoughts, of writing, of speaking, of 
shaping and forming, of finding out what the 
ancients have taught us about the locales of 
our living, and making a case for the truths 
and falsehoods of those teachings, of now, 
here, in these difficult times, telling the truth 
about what you've witnessed--all these set in 
hard and fast and linger far after the thrill is 
gone. That elephant abandon is very attractive 
at first blush, but it is one great image of the 
dangers of the pretty, deceptive face of inter-
pretive work. This work makes you suscepti-
ble to becoming "like the leading edge of wa-
ter running downhill--you go anywhere you 
are led, taking anything said to be true, want-
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ing to cry when you see others crying, want-
ing to laugh when you see others laugh" 
(Tsong-kha-pa [1357-1419], 2004, p. 222). 
No matter how long I do this work, I still can 
fall prey so easily to such furtiveness and dis-
traction, a sort of floating, brainstem-storming 
connectionism that, in the end is simply self-
indulgent, self-aggrandizing, and, frankly, 
cowardly. I know this too well: "using only 
joyous perseverance you will end up exhaust-
ed" (Tsong-kha-pa, 2002, p. 62) and exhaust-
ing the patience and good will of your friends 
and of your work itself. Practice is needed 
that seeks wisdom in the midst of this onrush. 
  
After the gold rush - "something awakens 
our interest - that is really what comes first!" 
(Gadamer, 2001, p. 50)--hermeneutics faces 
us with the deep, scholarly question: what the 
hell is going on? It rears up as a path that 
must be followed, a lead that must be trailed, 
a task that must now be undertaken, of finding 
out, of investigating, of questioning and fac-
ing the afflictions that swirl around the topic, 
the topography I have chosen to travel--my 
own deeply personal afflictions in terrible 
concert with the afflictions of the world I am 
investigating. It comes on like a summons 
with my name on it, my life at stake. 
  
"Do not place your hopes on sheer deter-
mination" (Tsong-kha-pa, 2002, p. 62). Only 
repeated practice will help, full of citatious-
ness, study, and a deepening knowledge of the 
ancestral lineages that we have often unwit-
tingly inherited, that need to get committed to 
memory or written out and savored and read 
to friends and neighbors. Hermeneutics, thus, 
involves a dedication to the careful, suspi-
cious reading and re-reading, interpreting and 
re-interpreting the texts and textures of our 
individual and common lives and worlds. And 
then, in the middle of all that, hermeneutics 
demands that I take on the task of composing 
myself while composing something about this 
world, while writing a "hermeneutic study." "I 
compose this in order to condition my own 
mind" (Tsong-kha-pa, 2000, p. 111) and 
through such conditioning and composition, I 
always hope to provide some relief to the suf-
fering and affliction that has spellbound me 
and my chosen profession. This is the unspo-
ken vow. And this is a warning that knows no 
heed: once you catch sight of that water and 
its promise of relief, you might find that you 
can't turn back, that you can't undo the 
glimpse, that you've taken the vow without 
knowing it and that you're tethered to it even 
if you can't then fulfill what that vow de-
mands. One common, lovely, terrifying com-
plaint: There are signs everywhere. Every-
where. How do I get it to stop? 
  
Remember, then, this is not just a matter 
of quelling the rampaging elephant with 
calmness and quiet: "no matter how long you 
cultivate serenity, you can only suppress man-
ifest afflictions; you cannot eradicate their 
seeds. You need to cultivate insight" (Tsong-
kha-pa, 2002, p. 22). Hermeneutics demands 
that we go through these afflictions (Erfha-
rung) and seek the aid of those who have 
gone before (Vorfahrung) and in this, seek 
insight, wisdom. Hermeneutic work is meant 
to induce and encourage others on this way. 
This is why it whiles and gathers and waits. 
This is why there is something pedagogical 
about it. 
  
One more corkscrew, then. After all that, 
hermeneutics slams us with this: There are so 
many things that could be said, so many pos-
sibilities, so much that could be read and 
learned, so much of an overwhelming cas-
cade--everywhere! What should I do? Well, 
welcome to Grad School, that most opulent 
life of leisure and opportunity (Latin schola, 
meaning "leisure," root of "scholar" and 
"school"). I'm reminded of how the great 
Tsong-kha-pa (2000, pp. 117-128) berates 
readers for wasting this rare gift lost in the 
flurry of more meager things. To paraphrase 
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George Harrison, that is not what we are here 
for.  
  
Here, where, despite the often-gnawing 
circumstances that surround us, we face the 
question of what needs to be said here, now, 
right in the middle of these troubling causes 
and conditions: 
 
We should have no illusion. Bureaucra-
tized teaching and learning systems domi-
nate the scene, but nevertheless it is eve-
ryone’s task to find his free space. The 
task of our human life in general is to find 
free spaces and learn to move therein. In 
research this means finding the question, 
the genuine question. You all know that as 
a beginner one comes to find everything 
questionable, for that is the privilege of 
youth to seek everywhere the novel and 
new possibilities. One then learns slowly 
how a large amount must be excluded in 
order to finally arrive at the point where 
one finds the truly open questions and 
therefore the possibilities that exist. Per-
haps the most noble side of the enduring 
independent position of the university—in 
political and social life—is that we with 
the youth and they with us learn to dis-
cover the possibilities and thereby possi-
ble ways of shaping our lives. There is 
this chain of generations which pass 
through an institution, like the university, 
in which teachers and students meet and 
lose one another. Students become teach-
ers and from the activity of the teachers 
grows a new teaching, a living universe, 
which is certainly more than something 
known, more than something learnable, 
but a place where something happens to 
us. I think this small academic universe 
still remains one of the few precursors of 
the grand universe of humanity, of all 
human beings, who must learn to create 
with one another new solidarities. (Gada-
mer, 1986, p. 59)  
But here is the good news, and a bit of a 
hermeneutic secret. All that hard, scholarly, 
detailed, difficult work, all that effort of prac-
tice, and reading and re-reading, of struggling 
to understand, to open up free spaces, real 
possibilities of shaping our lives, where un-
derstanding might grow and compassion 
might last, of underlining and hunting for 
sources, of page numbers and names and 
seeking out bibliographic trace-lines, and thus 
slowly composing oneself while composing 
an interpretive work-- all this ends up culti-
vating and deepening your ability to experi-
ence and share precisely that elephant aban-
don and joyousness. "[This world] compels 
over and over, and the better one knows it, the 
more compelling it is" (Gadamer, 2007, p. 
115). Only now, we experience that joy and 
abandon as it really is, in the full knowledge 
of the flesh and its passing.  
 
Hermeneutic work treats its topics like 
works of art that gather up our festive returns, 
topics that, in return for our attention and de-
votion, begin to glow in response to the atten-
tion we have bestowed upon them: 
 
Hugh [of St. Victor (1096-1141)] begins 
to explain what wisdom does. The sen-
tence begins, sapientia illuminat hominem, 
"wisdom illuminates man" . . .ut seipsum 
agnoscat, "so that he may recognize him-
self." Once again, in this rendering, trans-
lation and exegesis are in conflict, and the 
English words chosen could easily veil the 
sense that interpretation can reveal. En-
lightenment in Hugh's world and what is 
understood as enlightenment now are two 
different things. The light, which in 
Hugh's metaphoric usage illuminates, is 
the counterfoil of the eighteenth-century 
light of reason [a child of the Cartesian 
lineage talked about below]. The light of 
which Hugh speaks here brings man to a 
glow. Approaching wisdom makes the 
reader radiant. The studious striving that 
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Hugh teaches is a commitment to engage 
in an activity by which the reader's own 
"self" will be kindled and brought to spar-
kle.  (Illich, 1993, p. 17) 
 
What wonderful images and ideas. What 
joy to know that it will take me years, maybe 
more years than I have, to be equal to a text 
like this. This is love and affection. That texts 
and topics and works become more radiant 
and compelling the more we experience them 
and take care of them, until finally they start 
to stand there without us, "works" in whose 
light we are then cast. What in the world 
would we do if this were true? How would 
our lives be lived if this were a possible way 
of shaping ourselves? Just imagine trying to 
seek out this sort of experience and trying to 
practice it. That is what hermeneutics requires 
of us. It requires reading as if our lives de-
pended on it.  
  
So right here, that frankly stupid divide 
between scholarship and practice, between 
academic work and "the field" finally starts to 
let go of its grip. "All texts are instructions for 
practice" (Tsong-kha-pa 2000, p. 52): 
 
It is like showing a horse the racecourse 
before you race. Once you have shown it, 
you then race there. It would be ridiculous 
to show the horse one racecourse and then 
race on another. Similarly, why would 
you determine one thing by means of 
study and reflection, and then, when you 
go to practice, practice something else? (p. 
52) 
  
Here's one more secret about hermeneu-
tics. It culminates, slowly, into the insight that 
this world will be fine without me, and the 
great sense of relief that can slowly come 
from this insight, the great sense of setting 
down the panicky task of mastering things 
and feeling somehow essential to their con-
tinuance. That is what it means to truly under-
stand something in the hermeneutic sense. 
This is part of the elephant's cool plunge. All 
this is cast in the shadow of my own imper-
manence and mortality and there is relief to 
be had in this insight, this admission. 
  
"Take this feeling of letting go as your 
refuge" (Chah 1987). If we were not finite, 
none of this wonderful, ambivalent work of 
loving attention and composure would be 
necessary. If we were not finite, none of this 
would be possible: 
 
That which is not split does not have to be 
rejoined, thus going by way of ambiva-
lence circumvents coniunctio efforts of 
the ego ["a hitherto concealed experience 
that transcends thinking from the position 
of subjectivity" (Gadamer, 1989, p. 100), 
…hermeneutic experience] because by 
bearing ambivalence, one is in the coni-
unctio itself ["the true locus of hermeneu-
tics is this in-between." (Gadamer, 1989, p. 
295)]. This way works at wholeness not in 
halves but through wholeness from the 
start. The way is slower, action is hin-
dered, and one fumbles foolishly in the 
half-light. This way finds echo in many 
familiar phrases from Lao Tzu, but espe-
cially: "Soften the light, become one with 
the dusty world." (Hillman 2005, p. 41) 
  
So, "cultivate love for those who have 
gathered to listen" (Tsong-kha-pa, 2000, p. 
64), but a great part of this love means taking 
some care, warning, chiding, admiring, not 
abandoning those who are just beginning, 
working through what are slowly becoming 
known to be intimate afflictions tied to deep 
sources, causes and conditions, and some-
times overwhelming consequences. Herme-
neutics, like these Buddhist sources I've been 
citing, is adamant about the importance of 
finding a teacher (Tsong-kha-pa, 2000, p. 69-
92) and about taking refuge in a community 
of others seeking to do this work (in Bud-
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dhism, this is one of the "three jewels": com-
munity, Sangha), whether these be classmates, 
or, for me this summer, Tsong-kha-pa, my 
own light summer reading that I've re-read, 
now, seven times. Again, be careful. As a 
teacher in Tsong-kha-pa's lineage warns, 
watch out for that pretty face and that rushing 
cool lake allure: "the more intense the practice, 
the more intense the demons," this from 
Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887) in his The 
Words of my Perfect Teacher (Patrul, 1998, p. 
189).  
  
All this, of course, is why what happened 
next in this Graduate Class in the Faculty of 
Nursing where this talk was held, is the real 
site of all the hard, meticulous and sometimes 
agonizing work involved in cultivating a gen-
uine, sustainable and livable love for those 
who have gathered. This, in fact, is why this 
text ends so abruptly, because what happened 
next is itself a sort of un-shareable secret. It is 
the time of all those small back-and-forth 
words, small gestures, little referentialities, 
silences, little ventures and retreats, looks of 
panic, great laughter and relief, patience, an-
ger, and on and on, where things start to hap-
pen and gather and work. Pedagogy. It is 
when tales of abuse, of addiction, of children 
dying, of overwhelming busyness, of black 
humor, of strokes, and family gatherings and 
hope and love and despair come forward into 
the open space, and the tough work, the real 
work, of building new solidarities begins. 
  
Two quick words of thanks, then, to end 
this Foreword. First my sincere thanks to 
Shelagh McConnell for having the great pa-
tience to transcribe this talk with great skill. 
You saved me the unbearable task of hearing 
my own voice sound like a stranger's. And 
second, to Nancy Moules who has given me 
so many leisurely opportunities to practice 
these words that still seem to come out so 
half-clumsy, so, well, elephantine, too often 
with little cool water in sight. Our friendship 
and our shared dedication are a great comfort 
and a great refuge. 
 
The Descartes Lecture 
  
I’ve been working here in the Faculty of Edu-
cation since 1986. The types of work that 
have evolved in those intervening years have 
been really an interesting thing to witness. I 
expect that all of you in different ways have 
seen something of this in your own profes-
sions and own ways through the world, how 
some sort of shift seems to be in the air or 
wants to be in the air-- about what knowledge 
is, how knowledge works, who is in charge of 
it, what it means to demonstrate what you 
know, what counts, what is needed in these 
strange and rushing times, and so on. This has 
been set up in the past, as you all know, as 
paradigm wars or the old, exhausted quantita-
tive/qualitative arguments and debates. The 
good news is: that fight is over. Because part 
of that fight was premised on an attempt for 
the interpretive disciplines to demonstrate a 
certain legitimacy to, you know, figure out 
how to get "dad" to love and respect me. 
There was some headway made in certain 
quarters, and in other quarters, he just got 
more and more pissed off.  
 
So you know, the really interesting news 
after all these years for me is that interpretive 
work needs to be good, but it doesn’t need to 
demonstrate to those who don’t want to do 
this type of work that it should exist. If you do 
a statistically based study, you don't have to 
prove to me that statistics is a worthwhile dis-
cipline. You don’t. It’s taken for granted that, 
well, too bad, there it is. Same with interpre-
tive work. You don’t have to justify its very 
existence, even though, with some granting 
agencies, some tenure and promotion review 
boards, and some supervisory committees, 
this demand still arises.  
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You know: "Tell me about this 'hermeneu-
tics.' I’ve never heard of it." Oh well, okay, I 
guess that will be my problem….again. It’s 
only been around for 115 years in its contem-
porary version. But you know, patience is ap-
parently a virtue, even though having always 
to be the patient one is a pain in the ass, but 
you know, anyway, this is the situation we are 
in, always feeling like the upstart. This isn't 
just an accident of circumstance, because, of 
course, Hermes was a trickster, an annoyance 
who would never lie but never tell the whole 
truth either, a bit of a flit, a bit of a flirt.  
  
This is but one more sign of the continu-
ing dominance of natural-scientific work, that 
it can always demand that other forms of 
work "show their papers" like at a border 
crossing, but it never has to show its own pa-
pers. Hermes was the god of borders, but his 
role, much to the annoyance of the border pa-
trols, was to keep the gates open. 
 
The type of work you’re dealing with in 
this interpretive research course didn’t just 
arrive in the world. It has an immediate lega-
cy that goes back to 1900 and just before, 
maybe 1870: Dilthey, Schleiermacher, and so 
on. And it has a mediated history that goes 
back perennially from there to all those mo-
ments of facing the world and our peculiar lot 
in it, of needing to read the sacred text for 
some signs of how to understand our contem-
porary woes. Midrash.  
 
Part of what we all face, in this Faculty 
and in mine, is that we live in a world in 
which some forms of discourse have become 
dominant. And we all know that natural sci-
ence discourse has become powerful and pre-
dominant. And for good reason--it's so confi-
dent, so sure of itself, it has lead to such spec-
tacular things. Look, see…computer. It's ac-
tually taping my voice and will download on-
to a thing that you can carry in your pocket. It 
has found cures. And so pervades the pre-
dominance of natural science discourse, its 
forms of knowing, methodologies, its pre-
sumptions, its hopes, its desires, and so on. 
 
This isn't and shouldn't be a surprise to 
any of us. And it’s not an issue. Natural scien-
tific research methodologies and discourses 
are not an issue. This isn’t an argument about 
quantitative work versus qualitative work. But 
there is an argument that needs to be under-
stood and articulated.  It’s an argument about 
dominance and what falls into shadow under 
such dominance, what has been lost, forgotten. 
Because, as ecology has taught us in this past 
several decades and as many of us knew far 
before then, having a dominant or invasive, or 
pernicious, or exotic species in a certain place 
can sometimes take over and choke out the 
possibility of anything else. And, therefore, in 
the long run, in a lot of those cases, it can 
come to choke out the conditions of its own 
survival through its very act of domination. 
Monocultures are unsustainable. Being con-
cerned about the dominance of natural-
scientific discourse is therefore an act of love, 
an act directed at sustaining its well-being. It 
has lost any sense of proportion, any sense of 
having a place in our lives. It has taken over 
and become, well, monstrous. 
 
This is a very, very interesting phenome-
non. Ivan Illich called it counter-productivity: 
up to a certain point such "advancements" and 
"progress" and "expansion" and "standardiza-
tion" and "centralization" are sensible. But 
after a certain point, the way he put it was, the 
various ways of working in the world begin to 
create the very thing that they were designed 
to solve or to resolve. They begin to create the 
very thing they are trying to fix. That’s why 
school is producing ignorance, hospitals are 
producing super-bugs, and Deerfoot Trail is 
producing traffic congestion. It was great for 
a while, right? However, these things reach a 
certain level where, because of their predomi-
nance, they start to unwittingly work against 
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the very conditions under which they were 
working in the first place. So what I want to 
talk to you about today is not natural science 
methodology, quantitative methodology, but 
its dominance and how that dominance has 
affected us and affects what you want to do in 
this class, what it means then to try to articu-
late something other than that dominant para-
digm.  
 
One of the things about a dominant dis-
course that is important to remember is that 
those caught up in that dominant discourse 
don't have to understand any of this. But there 
is something more troubling at work here. Not 
only does a dominant discourse get to speak, 
and to get funded, to act and to be in positions 
of power and judgment which marginalize 
other forms of work, other ways of speaking 
and thinking and researching. A dominant 
discourse displays the depth of its dominance 
in its ability to define and shape the nature 
and limits of any resistance to that dominance. 
Its dominance is had in its unquestioned abil-
ity to characterize and speak on behalf of that 
which it is not. Just like the British got to 
speak about Africans, or teacher gets to name 
children and their special needs and no one 
gets to speak back (speaking back simply in-
dicates that that child has "oppositional defi-
ance disorder"). It is a very interesting rela-
tionship which hints at how all this is not 
simply an issue of "research methodologies" 
at all, but something older, more dangerous, 
and pervasive.  
 
I want to elaborate this phenomenon of 
dominance one step further at the front end 
here because this will, you'll find, be where 
the really difficult work in this class will have 
to be done if you are going to understand in-
terpretive work. Because of the dominance of 
natural-scientific discourse, that discourse 
provides a lingering image of what it would 
mean to do any other sort of work. All too 
often over these past 25 years I've see profes-
sors and students working with an ill-
informed image of interpretive work that is 
simply a projection of what the dominant 
voice of natural-scientific work allows alter-
natives to be. It's about telling your story. It's 
about people's experiences. We all have our 
own point of view. It's subjective, its personal, 
touchy-feely, wholeness, mush, and it's easy 
because you just say what you think, right? 
 
All of that and much more, is the domi-
nant discourse’s story about what you could 
possibly do if you don’t do natural scientific 
research. If we are objective, you guys must 
be subjective. If we are hard, you are soft, if 
we have outcomes, you have poetic sugges-
tions and temptations, and so on. But here is 
where it gets awful. Those doing interpretive 
work start to fall for this. Then what happens 
is that interpretive work starts weakly parrot-
ing concerns that are not indigenous to its dif-
ference: how many people should I interview? 
How do you look for themes? What about 
generalizability? How do you prove that this 
is not just "your interpretation"?...and so on. 
Because we've understood our own work 
weakly in the shadow of quantitative work, 
we fall prey to further weakening by the ques-
tions that then arise out of that weakness. 
 
And so part of the alertness that I expect 
this course is about and that good interpretive 
work must take on as part of the work itself, is 
about working on our own ability to remem-
ber what has happened to us in our attempts to 
do something different than the dominant dis-
course allows. This is why you'll find that in 
interpretive work there is a vivid interest in 
history, not in order to "understand the past" 
but to decode our present circumstances and 
revive our current memory loss. Because the 
ditch that is really easy for this work to fall 
into is wide and powerful to the extent that we 
give way and if we don’t remain alert, we can 
end up falling for precisely the meager and 
weakened caricature version of what we do in 
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interpretive work that has been "granted" to 
us by the presumptions of the sort of work we 
wish to step away from. This is just like nurs-
es falling prey to the caricatures that doctors 
can have of them and their work, or teachers 
falling prey to the belittling of their practical 
knowledge in the face of Standardized Pro-
vincial Examinations and The Fraser Insti-
tute's calls for accountability. In other words, 
this class isn't just about research methodolo-
gies, but about a structure of our lives, our 
living, that we have inherited and need to start 
decoding. Just a warning, then, that this isn't a 
situation that you fix up at the front end of an 
interpretive study so that you can then pro-
ceed free and clear of it. You never get free 
and clear of the world. It is persistent--what is 
this about, where did this come from, how did 
we end up speaking like this in this world of 
ours, what do we do now? This ongoing de-
coding and the stumbles and recoveries it re-
quires, is the work itself. 
 
In my profession for example, the trou-
bled child that can’t pay attention is named 
that way by the very system for whom trou-
bledness is already pathologized from the out-
set and so we don’t actually need to listen to 
that child because we already know what they 
could possibly legitimately say--this "code" or 
that one. We once named them "wild and 
willful" so they could be punished and have 
their wills broken (see Alice Miller's work on 
"black pedagogy"). We now name them 
ADHD so they can be medicated. And that’s 
what dominance does - I already know in ad-
vance what you can possibly say to me, so 
you really don’t need to say anything because 
you’ll either say what I already know or 
you’ll be wrong. The only reason for you to 
speak is so that I can find the right slot, not so 
I can ever question that slotting itself. That is 
a given, the "outcome" of research. The only 
issue now is "which slot." I will admit that 
that slotting might be in error or that I've mis-
characterized the slots and perhaps there 
should be more or less or different ones, but 
the correcting of that error means that in the 
future, it will be less likely for correction to be 
needed--the goal being to put an end, via 
dominance, of that which resists that domi-
nance, either through sacrifice (you will be 
eliminated if you resist--kicked out of school, 
put in a home, medicated into oblivion) or 
salvation--you will be saved if you don't resist.  
Resistance is futile because even resistance 
has been coded. 
 
This reminds me of why libraries were 
burned down by Christian and Muslim groups 
back in the 11th century in Northern Africa 
and Southern Europe. They realized that all 
the books in there either say the same things 
as the Bible/Koran, and therefore the library's 
collection was not necessary, or those books 
say something different than the Bible/Koran 
and, therefore, that collections were heretical. 
Either way, just burn them down. Differently 
put, interpretive work is very interested in 
normativity, dominance, issues of identity 
(cultural, linguistic, personal, gendered, even 
the great divide of the ill and the well, the 
quick and the dead) and how these things gets 
sorted out, and by whom, and to what ends, 
and so on. The sheer naive innocence we have 
about words, ideas, images, has to be inter-
rupted, as does the sheer confidence that this 
is just a technical problem, and that technolo-
gy will save us, or science or medicine or ed-
ucation. People will die and stupidity will win 
out almost every time. These are our real cir-
cumstances. Everything is contaminated, em-
bedded, interdependent, and nothing is what it 
seems on the calm surface. That is why inter-
pretive work is interested in things like the 
leveling of thinking and idle chatter and how 
familiarity can breed contempt, and the like. 
That is why interpretive work has helped us 
understand that not only is natural-scientific 
work dominant on the scene of research. It is 
an act of domination--knowledge as dominion. 
And again, any form of thinking and study 
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that is not premised on dominion gets cast as 
fuzzy, soft, feminine, weak, emotional, sub-
jective, and, in the end, self-indulgent. Just 
like hermeneutics! 
 
Okay, so I want to talk today then a bit 
about our amnesia. One thing that happens in 
a lot of research methodologies is that we be-
lieve at the outset that they are simply some-
thing that someone can tell you how to "do": 
here’s how you do it and then you do it. 
Right? And we find ourselves in a position at 
the university and in schools, and then lots of 
other quarters, that if a research methodology 
asks something more than that of me than that, 
then something weird is going on. And one of 
the things about interpretive work that is so 
painful is that at the outset it demands that we 
stop thinking about what to do and start to 
think about what’s already been done to us 
and how it’s ended up this way and why we 
talk about kids or patients or clients like this 
or that, and where those images and names 
and taken-for-granted practices came from 
and what they are dragging along with them. 
Like David Smith said, underneath the calm 
and cool and familiar and taken-for-granted 
surface of things, whether life itself has a 
chance, or whether the surface is all there is. 
But what very often happens in our culture is 
that we orient to simply what's next to ac-
complish and skip from surface to surface. 
Everything seems to be about just staying 
calm and afloat on the surface. Just letting it 
go by and saying, well, as a high school 
teacher said to me recently (and I’ve heard 
this dozens of times), "You don’t understand, 
this is just the real world. This is just the way 
things are." Right? It’s just the way things are. 
You're reading too much into it because there 
isn't anything really there. The surface is all 
there is. And all we can do is keep going be-
cause if you slow down, you're sunk. 
 
Well, one of the fundamental beliefs in in-
terpretive work is that this isn't simply "the 
way things are." This is how things turned out, 
and there are reasons that things turned out 
this way and not some other way--there are 
voices there, stories, things that have been 
forgotten and silenced and marginalized, 
hopes that have atrophied or been suppressed. 
Not thinking about these matters, exploring 
them, "researching" them, doesn't mean that 
the world is not full of implications on our 
very lives and the lives of our students and 
patients and friends.  And because of that, the 
very confidence with which we do what we 
do is surrounded by failure, by exclusion, by 
erasure, by lost dependents, by amnesia. And, 
therefore, to actually understand what we’re 
doing is to try to wake up and understand the 
fixes we are in, where they came from, and 
what might now be possible, what freedom or 
refuge we might want or need in the middle of 
all this.  
 
Wanting to try to wake up from this am-
nesiac state is a life-long task. And it’s also 
the definition of the tragedy of human life be-
cause, you know, now, at this is the tail-end 
of my career, I’m now starting to figure out 
that schools are pretty much the same as they 
were when I started thinking and writing 
about these things. There is a strange message 
here, that this work of thinking about our 
lives--well, not everyone is interested, not 
everyone is up to that task, and this has al-
ways and everywhere been true. You are here 
in this opulent position of grad school, where 
you've decided, whether you know it or not, 
to stop slumbering. And even though part of 
what comes to consciousness is that this ven-
ture is joyfully hopeless, even though we 
know we won't somehow finally succeed, still, 
that is the direction that interpretive work de-
liberately and bloody-mindedly faces: trying, 
again and again, to remember these threads of 
inheritance that we’re dragging with us, what 
they’ve done to us, and how our work gets 
shaped by those things whether we know it or 
not, whether we like it or not, whether we ex-
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perience it or not, whether we care or not. 
That’s why this work isn’t about telling me 
about your experiences. Because our experi-
ences are manipulated and designed and des-
tined to forget very often. This is why this 
work isn't about securing some safe place 
from which to launch a methodology, because 
it is about being implicated without having 
meant or intended to be, without knowing it, 
without deserving it. This is why hermeneu-
tics infuses in phenomenology's interest in 
"lived experience" the terrifying prospect of 
"false consciousness," where lived experience 
often hides darkness under its bright presence. 
So I want to start off by sketching out a very 
simple example that comes from a scenario in 
the classroom. Think of a situation of a teach-
er who’s been in a school for quite a while 
and has taught in that school for several years 
and a new student comes into the classroom 
and the teacher automatically recognizes she 
taught the older sibling of this new student 
three years ago when the two children’s par-
ents were breaking up. Things didn't go well. 
So up wells the strife of that past event and 
becomes something of the surrounding of this 
new student, and even the efforts to hold this 
at bay have their own complex surroundings 
of past experiences-- Professional Develop-
ment seminars bent on detailing how to deal 
with such uprisings in yourself as a teacher--
"Ten Tips for Tough Teaching," and so on. 
Even the old saw of "every child is an indi-
vidual" is profoundly full of ancestral ideas, 
voices, controversies and the like, even 
though we might not experience these imme-
diately, they are the undergrowth that is part 
of the fertility in the soil we inhabit.  
 
So when the separate and single event of 
this one child arriving occurs, we all know 
that there is no such thing, actually. Echoes 
from the classroom across the hall where this 
child was taught last year; a blue file folder 
with too much and too little information, faint 
memories of staff room conversations long 
forgotten. It may take a long time to work 
through, to work out or unravel, and so the 
memories of the teacher and the presumptions 
of the teacher and the past experiences of the 
teacher all get tangled and ignited under the 
auspices of what was supposed to be a single 
event. Now that other teacher who taught this 
new child last year across the hall was once a 
friend of the principal who has since trans-
ferred, and last year's vice-principal is now 
the principal. It was she, as vice-principal, 
who had to "deal with" this student last year, 
troublesome, with a file "this thick" and they 
had an IPP (individual program plan) for him 
as prescribed by Alberta Education, mandated 
under a program of studies written by "those 
guys" up in Edmonton (whom the now-
transferred principal slavishly admired and 
the new principal wants to set to the side in 
favor of a more "inquiry based" approach to 
teaching and learning). And, of course, sur-
rounding those guys in Edmonton, as well as 
this "new" thing, "inquiry," are tangled in ar-
rays of influences, affiliations, research, histo-
ries old and new, sob-stories, exaggerations, 
frustrations, success stories, hopes and desires 
and fears, and the like. Causes and conditions 
all the way down.  
 
Now yet another new student comes in the 
room with his parents, and we all know, inti-
mately and with great familiarity, that this 
doesn't simply add "one more thing" into the 
mix but in fact cascades through that already 
tumultuous mix, making each of the already 
roiling arisings tangle and untangle and thread 
and unthread, all over again. It's just like a 
new child in my family wasn't just "one 
more," but actually rattled back through those 
relations that were already ongoing, and actu-
ally transformed me into a father and my fa-
ther into a grandfather and made my father's 
fathering of me an issue that it hadn't quite 
been before. Nothing is every just "itself." 
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Now, there’s no sense going on and on 
about an example like this because it’s all too 
ordinary for words in some ways-- at each 
moment, we end up with these clusters of de-
pendent co-arising that rise and fall, come 
forward and recede, undulating, remembered, 
forgotten, resolved. And we all know that you 
can become practiced in finding your way 
through these things artfully, professionally 
and well. It is like imagining running down a 
crowded sidewalk. You can't exactly give 
rules for how to do it, but it can be done, and 
even if you run into someone, we know, with-
in negotiated parameters, how to correct this 
error and carry on--apologize, explain, and off 
we go. The principal relates to the Ministry, 
the Ministry's mandates guide the teaching of 
the child, the child relates to the new child, 
the new child is in the school of the principal, 
the parents, the leg bone's connected . . . thigh 
bone, hip replacement. It’s so ordinary, that 
its fabric and its workings, fall from sight 
very easily.  
 
It’s just normal, right?  
 
Now it’s hard to believe, but this phenom-
enon was downright revolutionary when it 
entered explicitly into the history of re-
search/philosophy around 1900. Edmund 
Husserl, in 1902, wrote the Logical Investiga-
tions--one of the founding documents of con-
temporary phenomenology, and he formulated 
the idea of--this is the technical term he uses: 
it is called everyday life. Or in German: the 
life-world, Lebenswelt. The Life World… like, 
well, this. Just everyday, ordinary, simple, 
negotiated, complex, multivocal, populated 
sites of action and agency, of words and im-
ages and ideas and projections and secrets, of 
past experiences and desires, of market ma-
nipulations and media events, kings and 
queens and great urban bustles, and hospitals 
and schools...great big institutions forged with 
forgotten memories and hopes and aspirations, 
with all the ordinary charts and graphs, politi-
cal suasions, issues of advocacy and account-
ability, cultures and multicultures, gender 
roles and disputes, heat and little light, eco-
nomic pressures, lies and truths, facts and fic-
tions, and on and on and on. All this mess. 
 
So in walks this second child into the 
classroom [laughs]. This is what Husserl got a 
glimpse of, that even the small event of a 
child walking into a classroom happens right 
in the middle of this whole tumultuous world 
with all the implicate orders of causes and 
conditions, all the mixed cultural memories, 
all the old decisions about schools and grades 
and everything all jumbled and all attached.  
Ordinary. The life world. And you can add in 
here too all the arrays of labels that can be 
used to name this kid—I love the latest one, 
"oppositional defiant disorder," where you not 
agreeing with me labeling you has a label. Or 
"learning delayed" or "gifted." And then even 
the controversies that these labels are not 
meant to be casually used like this. . . but 
Husserl identified a thing he called "flowing 
in," where the specialized discourses pro-
duced of the natural sciences' sorting mecha-
nisms start to become part of the ordinary 
coinage of everyday life. Like "normal." And 
with this also comes the swirl of things we've 
given up: "retarded," for example...we still 
carrying the entrails of what we've left behind, 
so we add "wellness" to "health" because it 
seems like a good idea, and we know beyond 
a shadow of a doubt that these terms, too, will 
wear out, and like beehive hairdos or disco-
balls, we'll wonder what in God's name we 
were thinking sometime in the foreseeable 
future and that this will happen no matter 
what we do.  
 
So you can see how even our language 
("that kid must be gifted") --that terms like 
these in elementary school or high school just 
waft out into the world and become common 
coinage as if we don’t need to think about an-
ything. We come to believe that words are 
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innocent. It’s just "oh he’s gifted…oh, right." 
And everybody knows exactly what you mean 
until you start talking about it and then it gets 
complicated. That’s why the familiarity of the 
life-world is such an interesting thing. When 
you ask people to actually give an account of 
what another person means when they say 
"gifted" you end up getting a glimpse of this 
thick, contentious, ambiguous, contradictory 
fabric of the life world--what Husserl called 
sedimented layers of sense pile one atop the 
other and completely obvious until some in-
terruption occurs. The stories start rolling out 
about the troubles people have had with these 
labels, and these stories are always more var-
iegated, ambiguous, multiple and heated than 
the labels themselves. And then, even when 
some interruption of this familiarity does oc-
cur, we tend, for the most part, to do our best 
to do repair work so we can get back to not 
thinking about it anymore, get back to finding 
it obvious. Just get better labels so we can get 
back to not having to think about these things. 
 
Now, this is where I want to talk particu-
larly about some threads of this complex, con-
tradictory inheritance that we’re all living in 
the middle of. How did it turn out that, in the 
midst of all this, natural-scientific discourse 
became dominant? And, therefore, what is 
interpretive work, anyway?  
 
We need to go back to around 1640. Two 
things. First, remember that we're searching 
for something about the dominances and am-
nesia we've learned to live with and have in-
herited. Second, from what we've already 
seen, there really is no such beginning date, 
actually. Because to actually pinpoint where 
these ideas would have originated is both im-
portant to do and fruitless at the same time. It 
has this funny aspect to it, because every time 
you turn around, things unravel and get away 
again. The gate gets left open.  
 
But the reason I am pointing out 1640 is 
because there was a very clear articulation of 
a very important shift, philosophically, in Eu-
rope and in this is buried something vitally 
important about our current lot.  
 
Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Phi-
losophy and his Discourse on Method were 
both composed around this time. And he had 
a very interesting purpose for writing these 
treatises. We have to remember that trying to 
name this purpose and trying to explore its 
consequences is not an attempt to find out 
who the bad guy was, but to find out who our 
relatives are. Genealogy. Because Descartes' 
purpose was actually really interesting. He 
looked out into the world he inhabited and the 
shifts and changes that were at hand--the 
shifting power of the Church, the burgeoning 
arising of new sciences, world wide explora-
tion and rising self-consciousness of modern 
Europe, and suggested that if we’re going to 
understand what’s happening to us and if 
we’re going to provide some continuity and 
stability to these freshly emerging new ven-
tures (in particular, what became known as 
modern science), we’re going to have to find 
out how to stabilize our relationship to these 
matters, and find some sort of solid, reliable 
foundation, some platform, something on 
which our work can reliably rest.  
 
Because, as goes the ancient adage, if you 
don’t build on a foundation then everything 
you build will be as weak or as solid as the 
foundation you build it on. And so if we don’t 
find a solid foundation for this new human 
venture, we’re going to end up having it col-
lapse on us in all sorts of random and differ-
ent ways. We’re not going to get anywhere 
because it’s going to keep eroding itself and 
so on. So, right off the bat, Descartes is inter-
ested in the foundations that lie at the advent 
of modern science, what we've inherited as 
quantitative research - natural science re-
search. His initiating gesture was to ask 
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"What is the foundation upon which we 
should build?" Sound familiar? Now the in-
teresting thing to realize is that the initiating 
concern of Descartes was an ancient initiating 
concern. What’s first? What’s most reliable? 
What’s most solid? What’s most true? What’s 
most unshakeable? So, in fact, we get in Des-
cartes’ work, an echo of ancient religious tra-
ditions trying to find out what the foundation 
of the world is. As we all know, the wise man 
doesn’t build his house upon the sand. Do you 
remember that old hymn? I can just barely 
remember it. He builds it on the Rock.  
 
In other words, foundations are important 
and they always have been, and even though 
Descartes' efforts were directed towards eras-
ing any old reliances; those very efforts are 
themselves old and reliant. This is an old, old 
story, this story of starting anew, and this new 
story of starting anew casts a new light on 
something that is age old and makes us able to 
look at this old thing anew. Ta-da! Hermeneu-
tics! 
 
Okay, so, here at the origin of modern sci-
ence you have the equivalent of a religious 
invocation. Where is my Rock? My wife just 
told me, by the way, Jesus decided to build 
his Church with Peter (Petros) as its founda-
tion--which is the same root as “petrified” 
meaning "rock. " I just found that out a couple 
of weeks ago. This is why interpretive work is 
often really, oh hell, I just thought it was the 
guy’s name. But it’s not. And what a coinci-
dence that Jesus would have picked him, eh? 
On this rock I will build my church. In other 
words, right in the presence of all that seri-
ousness that we've lived with ever since, in-
cluding all the literal-mindedness of funda-
mentalism, was a beautiful, funny play on 
words. It’s a good joke actually. I’ll build the 
church on Petros. Of course! Like I said, that 
was two weeks ago. This is what you have to 
get used to when you do interpretive work. 
That the world has these infinite layers of 
meaningfulness, that nothing is what it ap-
pears to be, and you'll have to get used to be-
ing humiliated over and over and over again. 
Humility, humor, humus, being human, earth-
iness, laughter. When the laughter arises, it's 
like a secret clue that something is going on 
beneath the surface calm. Like the little anec-
dotes told in the staff room, or the "there was 
this patient, once . . . ". Yep! All that too! 
Clues. 
 
The good news here is that everything, 
everything, is more interesting than it appears 
to be. 
 
So now Descartes is in this conundrum. In 
education, we call this conundrum the debate 
over going "back to the basics." And there’s 
something good about that call. There’s some-
thing good about saying “What are we doing?” 
"Should we keep doing this?" "Or are we in 
trouble, on the wrong track?" This, again, is 
an old story in the life-world, repeated in 
many ways, and even schools are organized to 
"start all over again" every September, or eve-
ry January 1st--clean slates, square one, wash-
ing away sins. Dead ordinary, this. Going 
back to basics. Great thesis topic. What's 
basic in pediatric oncology, that firm spot 
where all this rests? Not just drugs, not just 
treatments, not just families and the shadow 
of death over the young, not just that parents 
should die before their children, not just that 
everyone is going to live forever or die even-
tually. Where is Peter? 
 
So remember, right there at the advent of 
modern science was something akin to a reli-
gious invocation. This is why fundamentalism 
and foundationalism are of so much interest in 
interpretive work and why interpretive work 
is not fundamentalist or foundationalist. It 
knows that any claim for something being 
first is familiar, familial, an old story ambigu-
ously akin to other. One more "once upon a 
time" caught in the fabric of the life world.  
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So Descartes took upon himself this really 
interesting, brand new age-old task. He decid-
ed that he would examine everyday life and 
all the forms of knowledge and appearances 
of knowledge and the interdependencies of 
knowledge and claims to knowledge that he 
came upon, all the opinions and evidence and 
superstitions and worries and declarations. All 
of them. He did this in order to find out 
whether there was something in everyday life 
that could be relied on as an unshakeable 
foundation of how to proceed. He decided to 
do this in a way that seems abstract at first. 
He said "I’m going to look at all of these one-
by-one"-- he called this process "methodical 
doubt." His premise here was simple but im-
portant to stress: if it’s possible to doubt this 
or that form of knowledge, we’d better not 
use it. So, I’m walking over here and I’m as-
suming that the chair is where I see it to be, 
right? It would be goofy to be walking over 
here to doubt that, or to doubt that that water 
bottle I'm reaching for isn't there. But it’s pos-
sible to doubt it. I could be hallucinating; I 
could be dreaming. Last night I dreamt about 
doing this class and I was as convinced then 
as I am now. So you look out into everyday 
life and you go…okay we’d better not place 
our confidence on everyday perception, be-
cause if you get drunk or you put one hand in 
cold water and one hand in warm water and 
then put them both in the…right? One hand 
will feel cold, right? So perception is…no, 
you have to be careful! It can mislead. It can't 
be trusted because it is possible to be misled. I 
might be dreaming all this. It's possible. So 
this is what he did.  
 
Okay, then he said "Well, well, what 
about everything my parents told me? " Any-
body want to guess? I don’t know about your 
parents…[Student: "They were wrong?" 
(laughter)]. It's even worse that than! They 
may have been right and I could have simply 
misunderstood them. I could be wrong about 
them being wrong! It could have been me! 
You see, that doubt is possible. They could 
have been perfect in their knowledge, but I 
don’t know for sure that I understood them 
properly. And they could have been imperfect 
in their knowledge, right? So he says, oh you 
can’t do that…. this won't provide a solid 
foundation on which to build, what my par-
ents taught me. 
 
What about everything we read from the 
ancients? Aristotle, Plato, all those texts that 
we have inherited. Well, there could have 
been bad errors when the text was translated 
from Greek into Latin, and so on. They may 
have been deluded. I might be incapable of 
understanding, may have read it the wrong 
way. And even if I've read the commentaries, 
this or that commentator may have been nuts, 
or motivated by lust or desire or self-
aggrandizement. So Descartes kept going 
through all of this. What about everything my 
teachers told me? What about everything that 
people say on the street? Go back to that ex-
ample in the classroom. What the principal 
says? What the former principal says? What 
the parents contend? The child's experience? 
The education textbooks? The Ministry of 
Education? The latest research? Older re-
search? The newspaper? The Fraser Institute? 
My own opinions? What? Who? The doctor, 
the patient, the drug salesman, the janitor? I 
can't even be trusted to read the word of God 
in a way that is beyond doubt...literacy, trans-
lations from Aramaic, the interventions of the 
Church in editing things, my own feeble 
memory! 
 
All these familiar ways of the life world 
can’t be relied on unshakably and as you can 
see…guess what? Descartes discovered that 
the foundation of the world is not in the world. 
Sound familiar? Every single religious tradi-
tion has said this…just remember, again, 
we’re at the advent of modern science. Just 
don’t forget that. That’s why this is so inter-
esting. I cannot find the foundation of the 
Jardine  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2012 Article 8    15 
world in the world because everything in the 
world can possibly be doubted. So I can’t go 
to the world to find the foundation of the 
knowledge of the world I am trying to build. 
So this puts Descartes in a really interesting 
position because now he’s sitting by his fire 
going, well--I remember doing this several 
time in the sixties--uh-oh, now what am I go-
ing to do? Because that very thing, the ordi-
nariness of everyday life, that, when I was 
part of it, was so ordinarily reliable, ends up, 
because of its very ordinariness, to not be 
what I need. What do I do? Why am I doing 
this process? This is crazy. I’m going to go 
nuts. Uh-oh. Every tether to the world is not 
to be trusted. He became cut off from every 
worldly recourse, isolated, severed.  
 
In retrospect, this sounds a little crazy, but 
it’s also an amazingly courageous thought 
experiment. It’s partially a recapitulation of 
what most teenagers go through or what eve-
ryone goes through when a kid dies, or a par-
ent dies, or a job is lost, or when you leave 
home and find yourself adrift form all those 
old comforts. Very ordinary, but Descartes 
radicalized this process. Where you have this 
collapse of the familiar certainty that used to 
cocoon you and make you feel comfortable 
and it all of a sudden evaporates. It's Ecclesi-
astes. Descartes, like that old text, is doing 
this to himself on purpose. It’s very, very in-
teresting to have done—to try to be deliberate 
about this. It really is the sort of courageous-
ness that any spiritual discipline requires. 
Shedding the vestments of the world, cutting 
away, burning away, washing anything that 
cannot withstand this methodical doubt. Puri-
fication rituals. Baptismal images. Umbilical 
severances of old reliances. Old stories, these. 
So he ends up going, "Okay, maybe I should 
push this further. Maybe all of that confidence 
I have about going through this process of 
doubt should also be cast into doubt. Maybe 
that’s not reliable either. Maybe I’m just nuts. 
Maybe I’m just crazy." And so he ended up in 
this spot that kept getting smaller and smaller. 
And he ended up saying, "Maybe I’m not do-
ing this process at all. Maybe I’m not even 
doubting the world. " And he got stuck, as we 
all know, in this really tight curve. "I doubt 
that I'm going through this process, but I am 
doubting that I’m going through this process. 
Okay, maybe I should doubt that, but if I do 
that…?" So it ended up that I can’t doubt that 
I’m doing this because if I’m doubting that 
I'm doing this, then I'm doing this, and I can’t 
get out of that because if I try to get out of 
that, then I’m trying to get out of it. It sounds 
like a parlor trick: if I doubt that I'm doubting, 
then I’m doubting, so I can't doubt it.  
 
This is where the old saw that everyone 
knows about Descartes then comes from: he 
said "I doubt" and doubting is a form of think-
ing, and therefore, I am thinking and even if I 
doubt, it is still true. Therefore, I am thinking. 
"I think, therefore, I am. " Cogito--like cogni-
tion--and ergo [therefore] "I am," in Latin, 
sum.  
 
This is kind of like the Mona Lisa of phi-
losophy-- that painting that has become such a 
visual cliché that's really hard to actually see 
anymore. Everybody’s heard this thing so of-
ten, cogito ergo sum, "I think, therefore, I 
am," that it’s become almost laughable to hear, 
but in fact it was a really interestingly, weird-
ly accomplished outcome of trying to find an 
unshakeable, indubitable foundation. After 
doubting every single thing in the world, his 
own doubting of the world showed itself to be 
indubitable. Only once he had completely cut 
himself off from every escape route through 
the world did he find the foundation, deep in-
side himself, inside this abstract presence of 
himself to himself, "I am." Because even if I 
affirm that "I am not," I am affirming and 
therefore I am. So what we ended up inherit-
ing from Descartes was this really interesting 
new thing that hadn't quite been imagined this 
way before: an experience of "myself" as a 
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"subject," an "I" that is present to itself with 
great clarity and distinctness, that is "world-
less" and that assuredly is even if everything 
else is erased. This is new. And yet it is not 
new. This echoes, of course, the idea of a soul 
that is "in" the body but not "of" the body. 
Right at the moment of trying to found natural 
science, Descartes hit deep well water. 
 
So, now, Descartes starts to look at the 
characteristics of this foundation that he has 
found through methodical doubt. It is clear 
and it is distinct. It is singular, it’s self-
identical, and is not confusable with anything 
else, not attached to anything else, separate, 
severed off from anything else, de-
contaminated (Mary Douglas said that the un-
clear is the unclean). Remember that all Des-
cartes is affirming here is "I am." I may not 
know who I am beyond a shadow of a doubt. I 
may have a fairly good idea, but not beyond a 
shadow of a doubt. I may not know what I am. 
I am not even sure I know where I am, but I 
always and unshakably do know that I am. In 
other words, sheer self-identical existence 
with no properties. I am. Singular, univocal, 
clear, present, without contradiction or duplic-
ity. Whatever I am, I am. So you get this real-
ly weird abstract version of identity that has 
no substance to it: whatever this identity 
might turn out to be (since we don't know 
what it is, let's simply call it "X"), I know be-
yond a shadow of a doubt that X=X and this 
is singular, self-identical, pure and clean and 
clarified. Sheer self-identicalness.  
 
Okay, Old Testament, Exodus 3:13-3:14. 
Coming down from the Mount with the 
Commandments, Moses asked God who shall 
I say has sent me? "And God said unto Moses, 
I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt 
thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM 
hath sent me unto you." Just a reminder this is 
the origin of modern science. Just thought I’d 
mention that again. 
  
So what we get in Descartes’ work is a re-
affirmation of an old story at the same time as 
we get an affirmation of something "other-
worldly," purged of everything old and world-
ly--sheer existence: I am. So now he’s got 
himself inside of himself, completely de-
tached from the world and its ways, having 
found the unshakeable foundation.  
 
Now it’s not like the world actually 
ceased to exist in this whole process of me-
thodical doubt. It just slowly and methodical-
ly turned into something increasingly unrelia-
ble and shaky. So, now here, right here, is the 
big turn. These new sciences of his time are 
purporting to investigate the world and they 
need a foundation that is solid. But the world 
they are investigating isn't going to give it to 
them. Descartes realized that he can turn his 
attention back to the world, but now he has to 
be very careful not to lose what he has won. 
We don’t want to turn our attention back to 
the world and get re-absorbed back into that 
fray of the world and its amnesia, into its for-
getfulness, its contingencies, and ambiguities, 
into its presumptions and start acting on the 
basis of that because that’s not true to the 
foundation that has been established. In other 
words, if I’m going to go out into the world, I 
have to go out into the world with an eye to 
the foundation that I have found in my pro-
cess of methodical doubt, this X=X clarity. If 
I am going to find any "truth" in the world, I 
have to demand of the world the same thing I 
demanded of myself with methodical doubt. 
What the world really is in truth is not that 
messy fray of ambiguity and doubt and inter-
relatedness. If I go out into the world and see 
something shakable or dubitable, then it’s not 
real, it's "unfounded." If I go out into the 
world and see something ambiguous, it’s not 
real. Because to be real is to sit on the founda-
tion and to sit on the foundation is to sit on a 
self-identical clarity that’s unambiguous and 
uncontaminated. Therefore, anything in the 
world that admits of ambiguity, multiplicity, 
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interrelatedness, interdependence, metaphor, 
analogy, all those forms of…. well, shall we 
say, mess? No! Truth is not a mess but is ra-
ther clear and distinct. Therefore if there is 
any truth to be had about the world, the truth 
of the world is not a mess. Because the truth 
has to live up to something that is not a mess-
-the foundation.  
 
Therefore, when I find my way back out 
into the world, I have this new demand now 
that I make upon everything I meet. I do to 
everything that I meet in the world the same 
thing that I did to myself. Anything that’s 
doubtable is eradicated; anything that’s am-
biguous is eradicated; everything multiple or 
attached to something else is eradicated. Eve-
rything has to become, like I did, "itself" and 
not something else. Whatever this thing is that 
I am investigating in the world, it is what it is 
and it is not something else.  As with my own 
purified self-identity, I demand such purifica-
tion from the things I meet: X=X, whatever 
else may be. So just like a new (but not so 
new) image of the human subject appeared in 
the world, now something else new arrives: 
"objects." In other words, only things which 
can stand up against methodological doubt 
(the Latin is something like thrown against, 
ob- and -iacere) are real, because only they 
replicate the hard-won truth of the "I am"--
singular, separate, clean, clear, distinct, with-
out contaminating relations. So what now 
happens of course is that Descartes starts to 
say whatever there is in the world, in truth it 
is self-identical, self-contained, not attached 
to anything else. Descartes ends up quoting 
Aristotle. The term for this in Greek philoso-
phy is "substance." "A substance is that which 
requires nothing except itself in order to ex-
ist." That’s his paraphrase of Aristotle 3rd cen-
tury B.C. metaphysics. A "substance" is that 
which requires nothing else except itself to be 
what it is in truth. Therefore, the initiating 
presumption of our ventures out into the 
world is that if we want to know about the 
truth of that world, we have to cleave off eve-
rything we want to investigate from every-
thing it is attached to, every relation it has 
made, in order to try to get some determina-
tion of what the truth of that thing is, and all 
the subsequent relations of that thing with 
other things themselves have to be clear and 
distinct. Because its truth is its substance, its 
self-identicalness, its "X=X." 
 
Now, just on the side here, this is sound-
ing a little abstract [laughs]. Just a little…. 
This poor child [points to a student in the 
class] was having trouble learning to read and 
you [points to another student] were her 
teacher last year and I’m her teacher this year. 
And her parents have just come in and they 
want to know what’s going on. I make a case 
for her trouble being one thing and you make 
a case citing some other things. The principal 
who is also in the room, because that’s what 
they do, says, "Well look, you said one thing, 
you said another. Whatever her reading trou-
ble is, it is what it is. Right?" Everybody 
knows that: it is what it is (X=X, even if we 
can't agree on what this "X" might be). So if it 
is what it is, and the two teachers contradict 
one another, the contradiction can’t be in the 
thing because the thing is what it is. If the 
thing is what it is, then the contradiction…the 
contra is in the diction. Not in the thing. Ei-
ther you’re right or I’m right or both of us are 
wrong or we have specified things enough, 
but things are what they are. The actual trou-
ble in learning to read can’t be ambiguous-it 
is what it is. That’s what this means. It’s a 
weird kind of common sense confidence that 
when we run into ambiguity, something with 
multiple versions or debates, that it can’t ac-
tually be. It must be a mistake of some sort. 
Or lack of diligence or all sorts of stuff. Sen-
sible in its own way. 
 
So here’s what happens in education. In 
1900, somebody publishes an essay called 
"The Child. " A week later, somebody says, 
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you know, young kids are like that, but that’s 
not a really good description of older kids. 
Contradiction. The contradiction can’t be in 
the thing because things are what they are. 
There must be two things. So the next week 
two books get published: "The Young Child" 
and "The Older Child." You can see where 
we’re headed, right? And then somebody says, 
well young boys are like that, but young girls 
aren’t exactly like that. Contradiction. There 
can’t be a contradiction in the thing. There 
must be two things. Next week, four books get 
published: "Young Girls," "Young Boys," 
"Older Girls," "Older Boys." Actually, you 
know, the description you have for young 
boys is appropriate for boys of a lower socio-
economic status. But in rich families… So 
what starts to happen then is a process of in-
vestigation that purports something, finds a 
contradiction, bifurcates the thing, and causes 
two new studies or four or eight or twelve. In 
other words, now, if you look in quantitative 
journals in education, you’ll get papers like 
"The sub-nominal coding level of story-
schemata structure in young boys of Aborigi-
nal decent in urban settings from 1915 to 
1918: New wine in old bottles? " --I made that 
up, but you wouldn’t quite know it! So what 
you get in an attempt to protect the purity of 
the origin from getting contaminated, you get 
(in your profession more than mine) these ti-
tles that become more and more exotic trying 
to describe something more and more simple, 
singular and ordinary. More and more particu-
lar and straight forward. More and more care-
fully divided off from anything else. The sim-
ple logic of substance, X=X, finds, in travel-
ling the world, that it must constantly divide. 
So you get this really weird condition of con-
stantly having to qualify your work in order to 
preserve the purity of the first principle. Be-
cause if you didn’t have "aboriginal" in the 
title you’d be confusing one thing for another 
and things themselves, in principle, aren’t 
confused so there must be two things. So what 
we get is this proliferation, which is in the 
natural sciences, that the natural sciences are 
profoundly good at. Proliferation of specifica-
tion all with an eye to preserving this first 
principle, X=X. This is why natural-scientific 
research must always be "up to date," because 
it is constantly shedding the encumbrances of 
ambiguity and hidden contradictions.  
 
Oh I didn’t mention this. See this baby 
here [X=X]? This is called the Principle of 
Identity. It’s the central principle of formal 
logic, Aristotelian logic. And until specula-
tions about set-theory in the 1930s, it’s the 
first principle of mathematics. The first prin-
ciple of mathematics: if you come across an X, 
X is always X. You might not know what X is, 
but X is X is X. In working through an alge-
braic equation, X stays steady inside that 
equation When you go to another equation, 
this equation is not that equation, but inside 
this new equation, X is X--an unknown (not 
sure what X is) constant (X is X). The princi-
ple of identity unfolds into the principle of 
non-contradiction (something cannot both be 
X and not be X), which unfolds into the prin-
ciple of excluded middle, from which unfolds 
the whole discipline of mathematics. Starting 
with the principle of identity, every step in a 
mathematical proof participates in the clarity 
and distinctness of that first principle. Each 
step is clear and distinct. Therefore--finally, 
we've ended up with the origins of quantita-
tive research that dominate our professions--if 
I go out into the world armed with mathemat-
ics, I take with me that hard-won truth of the 
cogito. As long as I can proceed mathemati-
cally, every step participates in the clarity and 
distinction of the first step. You have to math-
ematize anything you meet in the world in 
order for the world to live up to the founda-
tion you have won. Welcome to the origin of 
quantitative research. Based on the origin of 
"I am." If someone asks about the legitimacy 
of a quantitative study, all you need to say is 
"I AM has sent me." There's just one more 
hint regarding some of the heat that comes off 
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this silly quantitative/qualitative debate. In-
terpretive work seems chaotic, like all hell 
breaking loose, heathen, pagan--both these 
mean "of the fields," by the way, outside of 
the Capital (where the sovereign "I am" holds 
sway). 
 
Okay, so, just a few more little steps. Well, 
sort of little steps. Because the logic we’re 
talking about here, this logic of doubt, with-
drawal, self-clarification, and the subsequent 
dispensation of that clarity as a demand made 
upon things--this is far more widespread than 
in the natural sciences. It’s important then to 
realize that this movement of condensation, 
the collecting together of confidence then is-
suance of confidence with great confidence 
has analogies historically and philosophically 
that we need to face up to because the domi-
nant discourse of the natural sciences has kin 
and brethren that it doesn’t know it has and I 
just want to talk a little bit about what those 
are. We've got to explore something of the 
terrible heat we often feel when we try to in-
terrupt this Cartesian logic. 
 
Okay, remember that I’m doing this for 
the world’s own good. If this self-
identicalness is actually the world’s founda-
tion of truth, then demanding this of the world 
is an attempt to help the world live up to its 
own truth and to help it discard those ele-
ments that are not part of what it truly is. Or 
to put it differently, the world is full falseness 
and fallenness, amnesia and sin and carnality, 
lies, deception, ambiguity, messiness, contra-
diction. And in order to understand the truth 
of the world is to save it from itself by de-
manding that it shed that which is not essen-
tial to its substance. I come in the name of 
truth. So there is, in this movement, an often 
hidden sense of its beneficence behind all of it. 
Or to put it another way, I’m doing this for 
your own good. I’m trying to save you from 
your own encumbrance that you don't even 
know that you have. You all know the term 
used when you have something in your quan-
titative research design that you forgot to con-
trol for and your results end up with this un-
controlled thing in them messing up your re-
sults? Contamination--your results can easily 
be contaminated. So, all of this is a type of 
purification ritual -- Descartes' methodical 
doubt was a purification ritual. Descartes 
sought the foundation of modern science in 
something akin to a purification ritual, as does 
every natural-scientific study that follows it. 
The life-world needs rescue from itself. More 
strongly put, these studies are salvational in 
their design and intent. 
 
Okay, so, purification, salvation, de-
contamination, the getting-rid-of outliers, the 
pulling of things into line, eradicating that 
which will not submit. As if this is the way 
that the world actually exists…separate, self-
identical substances, whose relationships to 
one another are all post-hoc. Remember that? 
Objects. Then we have to realize that in order 
to get the world to be like this, we may need 
to render it like this in order to save it from its 
untruth and render it into its truth. Steps. I 
know what’s true. I know what the foundation 
is. I know what’s most real. I know what it is 
to be a human being and venture properly in 
the world and be concerned after its truth. 
Therefore, when I venture out into the world 
and I run into people who do not understand 
this, it is my moral obligation to take with me 
something of this lesson I’ve learned--to India 
or to Africa or to North America. And, for 
their own good, I must let these people I meet 
know that if they mistakenly feel at home 
here in this mess, they are not actually, really 
"home." You’re actually away from home, 
immersed in the blood body of the world, 
without the "I am" to guide you. Home is ac-
tually "over there," in England, under the 
Crown (like the crown of consciousness, Vic-
toria as the "I am" of the Empire). So out here 
in the wilds, I’ll put in a Home Office, and 
you’ll have to get a pass that requires you to 
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home in on where home really is, that marks 
you as being protected under the Crown--like 
a pass-port to pass through the portal, show-
ing your "identity," your "identification." 
Now I’m doing this for your own good. I’m 
helping you to become civilized. I’m helping 
you cleave to the truth of things. And so, one 
the analogies that we’re dealing with here is 
colonialism. A couple of centuries earlier than 
Descartes, just prior to Isabella giving the 
contract to Columbus in 1492, the Jews and 
the Moors were expelled from the south of 
Spain because Isabella realized that until we 
become ourselves and no others (until A=A), 
we won’t be strong. Only when we become 
strong can we then head out and build an em-
pire. And so we "self-clarify" by purging our-
selves of everything we are not--we become a 
self-identical nation-state purged of all con-
tamination. So we kick out all the Jews and 
the Moors or worse, sometimes we kept them 
here and kicked them out in a different way--
the Inquisition was a purification ritual de-
manding singularity. We do this for their own 
good of course, too. By the way, two weeks 
after Columbus got his contract with Isabella 
to sail west, a guy named Nebrija, whose 
name is still on many libraries in Spain, a 
grammarian who went to Isabella and said, 
basically, that until you have a single lan-
guage in your kingdom, you cannot have an 
empire. And, therefore, you need to standard-
ize, clarify and decontaminate and universal-
ize Castilian Spanish and make it mandatory 
for everyone in your purview to give up the 
vernacular in order to be considered part of 
the kingdom. So to speak. So language itself 
was standardized by becoming singular, un-
ambiguous, not multiple anymore, and this 
was done as a way to launch the colonial con-
fidence of Spain westward. Language be-
comes singular and self-identical. X=X. This 
is exactly the same as the move to strip First 
Nations kids of their language and their fami-
ly names, again for their own good. It is ex-
actly the same. And we'll have no Moors and 
Jews in our midst, no "others." Purification, 
with, like Descartes methodical doubt, a move 
inwards towards the clean and clear and dis-
tinct self-identity requisite of this new phe-
nomenon in the world: the nation-state. The 
very idea of a nation-state is premised on this 
state of singularization, and dumping our con-
tingent relationships to the diversity and mul-
tiplicity in our midst, telling it to either smart-
en up or leave. This is Canada, Mr. Singh, 
you better either become one of "us" or go 
back where you came from. So, purification, 
standardization, expulsion, what else? 
 
This founding of the nation-state in Spain 
doesn’t just back away into itself. It backs 
away, "founds" or "grounds" itself, and then 
launches back out into the world. This is the 
same analogous movement as the origin and 
launching of modern science. Because mod-
ern science will go out and demand mathema-
ticity from the world in the same way that the 
Spanish would go out and say "Christian or 
not?" Enrique Dussel talks about the dual 
myths that arise here: the myth of sacrifice or 
the myth of salvation: I will save you (by 
making you into me) or I will kill you (but 
sacrificing you will be for your own good, so 
sacrificing you will save you, because if 
you're not me, you're already living in untruth 
anyway). George Bush: you are either with us, 
or you are with the terrorists.  
 
Okay, so now, purification, colonialism, 
standardization. Through clarification, "we" 
control the right of passage to the truth--the 
"colon" through which you must pass in order 
to pass. So then, when the British Empire 
starts collapsing and retreating, what hap-
pens? All sorts of brown people pass with 
their passports through the portal and "come 
home." They show up at England's door say-
ing "Hi Mom. We're home!"  
 
Yes, that’s a rite of passage, that things 
must "pass through" the narrows of mathe-
Jardine  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2012 Article 8    21 
matics--colon. In fact, “Christophe Colon” is 
Columbus’s real name, which is just unbe-
lievable. But in order to be a citizen of the 
world, his name had to be Latinized. Because 
of the Roman Empire and the centrality of 
Latin, Latin made you a citizen, civilized--
these colonizing demands are age-old. Caro-
lus Linne became Linnaeus right, because you 
weren’t a citizen of the world until your name, 
even your name, was rendered under a uni-
versal standard, Latinized. This is why learn-
ing Latin was linked to be a civilized and ed-
ucated person--still at work in my own days at 
school, this still lingered. (The Grammar of 
our Civility (Pearcy, 2005)--very interesting 
book by the way). So this is a really old, in-
teresting story. To find out that this guy Lin-
naeus wasn’t really Linnaeus, it was Linne. 
And he had to give that up in order for him to 
properly be himself. Which, again, is why 
First Nations children in Canada had their 
names and language removed as an act of be-
neficently saving them from themselves. It is 
also why their land was privatized, because 
then, land gets linked to ownership, and own-
ership is linked to rights of governance or 
domination over that land, so property owner-
ship became identified, in the US, for exam-
ple, with the right to vote. Only as a property 
owner is the dominance of my "I am" able to 
manifest. Ok, so, yes, copyright laws. 
 
Okay, let’s just keep going a little bit fur-
ther here. It’s not that I and things in the 
world don’t have relationships, but they’re all 
post-hoc. They’re all "after the fact" of things 
and selves existing separately, divided off.  
That is existing indivisibly. That is individual-
ly. As with Descartes, we now take these 
truths to be self-evident. Contemporary no-
tions of individualism, this is where it starts. 
This is what the autonomy and self-
determination and individuality that under-
writes contemporary democracy, this is where 
it comes from. So, now, if you go back and 
see all these autonomous beings all of whose 
relationships are post-hoc, and that is after the 
fact of their autonomy, everything is revoca-
ble and provisional, including your culture, 
right? So this is where we get modern ver-
sions of multiculturalism. Where your culture 
becomes a "choice" made by someone who is 
really and truly autonomous individual, not 
really a Moslem or a Jew. You’re an individ-
ual and then, in "our" culture (which now isn't 
a culture among others, but simply an expres-
sion of the way things truly are), you get to 
choose the practices of your culture or not. 
But these choices are now post hoc, after the 
fact, simply personal and subjective, because 
only the relationships that themselves can be 
mathematized are "real" or "true" relation-
ships. So then you not only get frequency and 
repeatability of relationships or they’re not 
real, you also get the enumeration or mathe-
matization, of all these relationships. These 
are all zero sum relations that can be quanti-
fied.  
 
In other words, the community is full of 
autonomous "X=X"s and the real relation-
ships between these autonomous individuals 
are only those that can be mathematized. So, 
first of all, everyone gets one vote and then 
we add them up. It's only fair. It has nothing 
to do with who you are, what you know, 
whether you have any sense at all regarding 
what a good choice might be. After all, who 
am I to say? I'm just one more voter, and 
whoever gets the most wins. Parallel to this, 
community becomes identified with the mar-
ket, because now you get relationships of 
ownership (by an "I am") and then the only 
"real" relationships are those that can be 
measured, so community becomes commerce 
between autonomous "I am" owners-persons. 
That’s why you guys are called clients and 
customers of the University and it’s all about 
choice and individual freedom. This is where 
the discourse is coming from…so you also get 
the market, and you also get capitalism as a 
standardized system of exchange that slowly 
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starts to replace the messiness of barter and 
the commons. Check out the history of the 
enclosure movement in Europe, privatization, 
taxation, where commoners who worked the 
commons became tax paying employees, and 
the land became owned. Market economies 
and capitalism are premised on this new sense 
of individuality. Purification, colonialism, in-
dividuality, privatization, democracy, market 
economies, multiculturalism. 
 
But then, because of all this--and we're 
still experiencing this day to day-- we get the-
se strange senses of alienation from our com-
munity and from our work that now has be-
come distant, disembodied, standardized rule-
following, so you end up with Karl Marx cri-
tiquing the alienation of workers. And also, 
given that we’re all, in reality and in truth 
standing separately from each other, we also 
now need a mathematized/medicalized under-
standing of our sinful and lusty relations to 
each other or our sense of depression and al-
ienation. Freud: no more fucking in the bush-
es! Well, you’re still fucking in the bushes, 
but now you’re unhappy about it because you 
all know that it’s contamination, but it is no 
longer a Church matter full of snakes-in-the-
trees storytelling superstition reprimands, but 
is now medicalized syndromes that have 
mathematized our sin, coded it into identifia-
ble DSM-IV slots. Wellness! A personal mat-
ter. Even better! Self-improvement is sold 
back to us as a cure for the ails that that sell-
ing has caused. 
  
Colonialism, capitalism, democracy, indi-
vidualism, psychologism, market economy… 
Oh and by the way, I live in Bragg Creek and 
for your own good we’re going to cut those 
paths wider to prevent forest fires. To prevent 
forest fires means to prevent a waste of capi-
tal--new initiatives for clear cutting were 
fronted by forestry companies, so the material 
of the forest will still be logged safely, and so 
insurance companies are satisfied. So we have 
the beginnings of an ecological disaster here 
as well, severed from the world and then un-
hesitatingly ravaging the earth for its own 
good into board feet of consumable lumber. 
Like quantitative research will invade the 
classroom and save the messy life worlds of 
children and teachers by building sub-
divisions. That wild itself has no truth in it. It 
becomes true only when it is civilized, when 
the rough beast of the bush becomes a 
trimmed British Garden. Only when the earth 
submits to God's command that we, in His 
name, have dominion over the earth--only 
then is it truly itself. So there it is again, ecol-
ogists sound Romantic, hysterical, "spiritual" 
(i.e., messed up), but not in any sense true 
(since the criteria of truth is that things exist 
independently of one another, and claiming 
dependent co-arising cannot be true, only a 
blurring of what has been made clear-cut). 
Just like these brown newcomers and their 
constant complaints about Canada. Shape up 
or ship out. Okay, ecological ravaging is co-
lonial is Cartesian is the root of quantitative 
methodologies. The earth is private property 
because only when it is owned is it brought 
under the measure of an "I am" and only then 
is it in truth what it really is. Native people 
are wrong and need to be saved from their 
silly ideas. They need to learn reserve. I know, 
it's not funny. 
 
Okay, three more.  
 
If this is the way that people actually exist, 
then I’m just going to add a really interesting 
thing that happened in 1540 or about, and that 
is the printing press. Which meant a couple of 
things. The ability to disseminate the written 
word quickly and easily. Then you get the rise 
of literacy and an increasing suspicion of 
orality, storytelling, things passed from breath 
to breath, women talking in the woods, con-
spiracy. Those nurses telling tales during the 
break, those teachers in the staffroom full of 
messy little anecdotes--nothing true there, on-
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ly mostly women talking and talking. So the 
move from orality to literacy and the in-
creased suspicion of muttering. Literacy as a 
way to tame the wild, become civilized, civil. 
And also, right here, put up your hand if 
you’re a Lutheran. Any Lutherans? Okay… 
Luther took it upon himself to translate the 
Bible into German, into the vernacular and 
away from the standardization of The Church 
because believers are individuals and must 
work out individually their relationship to 
God and its saving grace. No longer mediated 
through the mess of the world and Churchy 
control, no longer through the line of saints 
and commentators and mediators or priests as 
your stand-in. So, thank you printing press, 
we’re going to give you each a German Bible 
if you’re a German so that you can read it 
yourself. So you put a Bible in each of these 
houses. To put it differently, Protestantism 
doesn’t make sense without these: individuali-
ty, autonomy, "I am," and so on. Protestant-
ism needs Cartesianism's loosing of individu-
ality in a new way. This is why Protestant 
Churches have empty crosses and not cruci-
fixes. The body of Christ, the world-body, is 
now risen, absent. No more worldly images, 
no more statues and portraits, no more work-
ing our way through the bloody corpse of the 
life world. Or to put it differently, that old 
life-world mess of a diagram that we were 
looking at before was very Catholic. Old 
council of Nicaea arguments, back to 767 CE, 
about images and their dangerous allures--not 
just false, this, as we all sit groggy in front of 
the latest news. It's the trouble of Danish car-
toonists as well. Remember this is the origin 
of modern science. 
 
Okay, so Protestantism and Islamic icon-
ophobias. The glance looking for truth must 
look "upwards" to the heavenliness of the "I 
am" and away from the mess of the flesh. And 
of course, if you’re going to put a Bible in 
every house and have people read the Bible 
themselves, they had better be able to read 
because it’s really, really important and if you 
can’t, you’re really in bad trouble. Some ori-
gins of modern schooling began here and so 
now we’re back to the kid who is having 
trouble reading.  
 
Meanwhile, of course, we've also become 
a culture that is simply slathered with rapid, 
seductive images and we think, now, that we 
can just toy with these things, like naive inno-
cents, that somehow our "individuality" and 
"choice" is going to protect us from being led 
astray. Hah! Hilarious. We get alienated, sev-
ered from our surroundings and our earth 
selves and then, full of guilt, get emotionally 
caught up in reality TV as a sort of porno-
replacement for living a life. Just like with the 
shows of African kids with flies on their eyes 
and sad faces: arms-length guilt-manipulated 
poverty porn. 
 
One more convoluted thread. Last one, I 
promise. Remember how nice it was when we 
started out and everything was fine? Looks 
funny now--we just talked with one another, 
got our cups of coffee, joked, and settled in, 
and what starts to happen is that this ordinari-
ness starts to look peculiar. This dominant 
discourse of the natural sciences starting to 
cast a shadow over the everyday life from 
which it has withdrawn and which it then ren-
ders into the objective world by mathematiza-
tion. Anything not mathematized starts to 
look different, look, well…wild and woolly 
and out of control, and chaotic--individual, 
personal, subjective, fanciful, random, idio-
syncratic, and so on. So in schools if you talk 
about pursuing an adventurous inquiry with 
students, you're saying that the kids can now 
to whatever they want, right? Because that’s 
what this means now, right? You do what 
you’re told (quantitative research) or you do 
whatever you want (qualitative research).  
 
These now seem like the only alternatives 
and this infests interpretive work itself: either 
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I just passively let my participants tell their 
story, or I tell mine. Us and them. If we let go 
of mathematization, all hell breaks loose. See 
what just happened? If the opposite of doing 
what you’re told is to do whatever you want, 
you’ve left in place the idea of individuality, 
left in place that the only way out of individu-
ality is mathematization, and then simply 
dropped the math. If you do this, any story 
that someone tells you is their own personal 
property and only they get to say what it 
means. So in attempting to get away from the 
dominant logic of the natural sciences, we 
leave it in place, accept all its premises, and 
then opt for the only opposite that that domi-
nant logic leaves available. This is this weird 
double logic where the dominant discourse 
starts to say, “Nurses, all they do is hang 
around and tell each other stories…and they 
just clean up after people and take care of 
them. They don’t know anything in that actual 
practice of nursing except what medical sci-
ence has taught them. There is no knowledge 
in the life-world, just messy, uncivilized ex-
changes.” Same goes for teachers: no sense 
talking to them about their classroom and 
what is going on because they are involved in 
it, caught up in its messy flesh, and therefore 
don't and can't know, in truth, what is occur-
ring there. They are contaminated. So even if 
I collect these stories together in my interpre-
tive research, I have to distill (purify) them 
into themes that are repeated, because repeat-
edness means (ac)countability, and frequency 
means some truth is there, something reliable. 
But the truth is not in the telling, but in the 
renderable essence that can be gleaned from it 
providing you speak with a statistically signif-
icant number of "participants." So students 
who want to do hermeneutics ask me, how 
many participants should I talk to? 
 
So you get all of these stories told by the 
dominant discourse of the natural sciences, 
not just about itself, but what you possibly 
could be doing if you weren’t doing that. This 
is the trick you have to remember. Because 
when that happens, when we try to do inter-
pretive work, we start to take on the language 
that the dominant discourse has left us with. If 
we’re not objective, what are we? Subjective! 
And a lot of us go, "yep, you betcha, that's 
us." Because what interpretive work must be, 
we are told, it’s subjective. And the dominant 
discourse, meanwhile is going, “Oh, this is 
fantastic. Perfect." Because, in doing this, you 
have, in  your very attempt to get away from 
the dominant discourse, confirmed that domi-
nance by accepting the description of your 
own work that is supposed to be the alterna-
tive to the dominant discourse. Remember, 
the dominant discourse of the natural sciences 
is not simply predominant. It is about 
knowledge-as-domination.  
 
Or to put it differently, here's the difficult 
part of this course you're taking: interpretive 
work is not subjective, it’s not about personal 
experiences, it’s not about people telling their 
story and finding themes, that is all a crappy 
version of quantitative research that is found 
in almost every single book about how to do 
qualitative research. It is simply falling for the 
shadow-version of interpretive work that the 
natural sciences allow. Hook, line, and sinker. 
You can look in textbook after textbook after 
textbook. They are simply full of nothing 
more than weak quantitative work in the guise 
of fuzziness, softness, resonance, feeling, 
emotion, or other such stupid things. Wom-
en's work. Touchy-feely. Nurse-y stuff. Inter-
pretive work is about how to approach the 
life-world and understand its life without 
threatening it, and domination and demand. 
 
So, then, that last one I've promised too 
often, and then we can have a break.  
 
This is the one I always don’t want to talk 
about, but I am going to. On the one hand, 
material, the material world, the messy life 
world, blood and guts, trails of implication 
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and interrelation, innuendo, stories, fabrics, 
like text and textile, and we're caught up in 
this world, defined by it in ways that have al-
ready taken hold of us before we try to get 
ahold of them. Implicated--like Gadamer says, 
beyond our wanting and doing. Materiality. 
And then, on the other, we have the pattern--
the self-identical, the autonomous, the ren-
dered into A=A, the clear and distinct and 
morally correct. Mathematics is based on the 
recognition and clear and distinct repetition of 
pattern, right, replicability? Repeated stand-
ardizable pattern is the only path to reliability. 
Otherwise one's results are not reliable. Mate-
riality is unreliable. And remember, in such 
mathematization, "I" become "one." "I" must 
become anyone in order for my research re-
sults to be true. Otherwise, I have contaminat-
ed those results. The methodology must be 
wielded anonymously. I must be completely 
and utterly replaceable. Only when I am re-
placeable are the results I have found detach-
able from my finding of them. Only then are 
then "objective."   
 
But we have to remember what this logic 
has left us with, that material needs pattern in 
order to understand its own truth. Left to itself, 
the materiality of the world has no indigenous 
truth because it is simply caught up in its 
messy interdependences. It is blind, mute, un-
knowing, stupid, dull, full of torpid familiari-
ties. Unless the pattern of material can be 
gleaned, then we don’t know anything true 
about material. It’s just subjective then, right? 
Or accidental, or anecdotal or whatever. So 
it’s important, it’s a moral necessity that pat-
tern demand of material that the material live 
up to the demand that the pattern makes on it. 
And if it doesn’t, then it is refusing to be in 
truth, refusing to recognize its own truth, re-
fusing to give up that which is not true of it, 
its accidentalness, its contingency, its earth-
boundedness. Therefore, it is the moral obli-
gation of pattern, if it has to, to impose itself 
on the material of the world for the good of 
the material of the world. Not because it 
wants to be dominating or anything, but be-
cause it doesn’t understand this forceful im-
position as an act of domination.  
 
It’s an act of salvation, of liberation.  
 
The colonizers in North America were 
always smiling.  
 
They always had good news, if you would 
only shut up and listen.  
 
The forceful imposition of pattern on ma-
terial. So let's erase the letters that hide the 
truth here: Pattern, pater, material, mater. 
 
At the advent of modern science, we have 
the old and familiar adage, that if she would 
only have fucking listened to me, I wouldn’t 
have had to hit her, but she just kept fucking 
talking and she wouldn’t do what I asked her 
to do, she kept talking back and kept fucking 
with me. So I had to stop her. I didn't want to, 
but it was for her own good. 
 
During his methodical meditations, out-
side of Descartes' window, women were being 
burned as witches … 
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